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Abstract
The foundations of the marketization reform in railways 
market are the diversification of market entities and the 
normalization of market order. The reform in 2013, where 
government function was separated from the business 
function, eliminated the obstacles derived from mixed 
organizational functions for the normalization of market 
order. However, even though the business function 
has been transferred to China Railway Corporation, 
Government should take on the responsibility of regulating 
the unified scheduling authority which shows both public 
and private business features governed by CRC for the 
sake of public interest. The Unified scheduling power, 
on which railway corporations’ lives depend, should be 
regulated by rules from both market and government 
and supervised by the public, in order to avoid the abuse 
of power, to reduce the possibility of corruption and to 
lay the foundation for a better development of China’s 
railway market.
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2004, the State Council of China officially 
published a development plan named “Medium and 
long-term plan of railway network” which planned that 
Chinese railway network would have reached more 
than 120 thousand kilometers by the year of 2020, 
and Chinese railway construction entered into a fast-
developing period since then. from the data collected by 
the National Railway Administration of China (hereinafter 
referred to NRA), the national investment in railway 
infrastructure has escalated steadily from 52.9 billion 
RMB (approximately 8.45 billion U.S. dollar) in 2003 
to 797.5 billion RMB (approximately 127.4 billion U.S. 
dollar) in 2010 and the number grew by over 13 times. 
The total investment in railway infrastructure in 2013, 
in comparison to the amount of 2010, declined to 532.7 
billion RMB (approximately 85.1 billion U.S. dollar), but 
it still showed a great leap forward from the year of 2003.
The figure 1 shown below could well illustrate the 
trend of the investment and construction of railway 
network from 2003 to 2013. furthermore it also shows 
about the contrast between the total investment and the 
investment made by Chinese central government1.
Conspicuously contrasting with the escalating need 
of investment and the demanding task of construction, 
the condition of assets held by National Railways is not 
promising. According to news reports, the total asset 
of former Ministry of Railways2 was 4.3trillion RMB 
(approximately690 billion U.S. dollar) at the end of 
1 Data was collected on the official website of National Railway 
Administration. See http://www.nra.gov.cn/fwyd/zlzx/hytj/ (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2014). The diagram was designed and made by 
the author according to the data offered on the website. However, 
it should be noted that the data of 2013 was not complete and the 
number 84.79 billion dollar shown under the investment made 
by Chinese central government was actually investment made by 
central government and joint ventures. 
2 Before the reform in 2013, all the national railway infrastructures 
were constructed, owned and operated by former Ministry of 
Railways, the business function of which was transferred to the 
newly created China Railway Corporation in the institutional reform. 
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the third quarter of 2012, and the debt was 2.66 trillion 
RMB (approximately 425 billion U.S. dollar). With the 
dangerously high debt asset ratio of 61.81%, this figure 
tended to be even higher (Li & Meng, 2013), The diagram 
explicitly shows that even though the investment made 
by Chinese Central Government has dominated in the 
 total investment all these years, the demand for local3 
and private investment has been increasing all along. 
Therefore, the normalization of Chinese railway market 
should be the key to the further openness of the market 
and a prerequisite to abstract private and local investors. 
figure 1
Total Investment in Railway Infrastructure, Investment Made by Chinese Central Government and Newly built 
Railway Networks from 2003 to 2013.
In 2013, 3“Plan for the Institutional Restructuring of the 
State Council and Transformation of functions Thereof”44 
officially raised the concept of “functions separation” 
in the railway market and eliminated the Ministry of 
Railways which enjoyed both public function, as the 
regulator, and private function, as the biggest railway 
holding and operating company of China. Instead, China 
Railway Corporation (hereinafter referred to CRC) 
was found to assume the private function of the former 
Ministry of Railways and the above mentioned NRA 
was created to assume the public function thereof. Such 
reform set the organizational foundation for further 
marketization reform in the railway market; however, 
private investors still face many obstacles and scruples 
entering into this market. Profit is the direct aim of private 
capital, and railway market is not a perfect playground for 
private investors because railway market bears the public 
obligation for transportation and additional regulations 
would be in place as a supplement to market rules. 
Meanwhile, the threshold to invest in railway market is 
relatively very high due to the high-cost construction of 
3 The term “local” hereinafter refers to something from local 
governments. Therefore, local investment means investment from 
local governments and local railway companies mean railway 
companies owned and operated by local governments.
4 See Plan for the Institutional Restructuring of the State Council and 
Transformation of functions Thereof. Retrieved from http://www.
npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2013-07/18/content_1810943.htm
railway infrastructure and the investment return period 
could be long, especially in the less-developed area like 
the north-west part of China where transportation can 
hardly be a profit-making business. furthermore, even 
though public and private sectors were officially separated 
in the sense of organizations, the leftover traditions of 
policy orientation and lack of transparency still deeply 
affect the railway market and keep most investors at bay. 
Therefore, after the organizational separation, it is very 
necessary to clarify and standardize all the regulative 
authorities among which there is a unified scheduling 
authority worthy of special notice. The unified scheduling 
authority was formerly owned by the Ministry of Railways 
and was assumed by the CRC in 2013.
The Unified Scheduling Authority is to coordinate 
the transportation capacity according to the demand for 
transportation and to apply transportation capacity into 
use. Such power could be very decisive with regarding 
to the productivity of railway companies, because all 
railways which are connected to the national railways 
are subjected to this scheduling authority and no train is 
allowed to operate without the permission and scheduled 
plan made by the authority. However, there is no 
normative rule or clear substantive standard to regulate 
this scheduling authority of such great importance, which 
has profoundly impeded the further marketization reform 
of the railway market. Therefore, this article is going 
to discuss about a proper way to regulate the Unified 
Regulation of the Unified Scheduling Authority in the reform 
of Chinese Railways: Consideration under the background of 
functions Separation in Chinese Railways Market
118Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
Scheduling Authority, based on a close examination of 
the essence of the authority and a comparative study of 
foreign experiences, in order to normalize the railway 
market, to mitigate policy risk, to prevent corruption and 
eventually, to abstract private investors.
1 .   T H E  U N I F I E D  S C H E D U L I N G 
AUTHORITY IN CHINA
1.1  The Essence of the Unified Scheduling 
Authority and Its Justification
As mentioned above, the Unified Scheduling Authority 
is to coordinate the transportation capacity according to 
the demand for transportation and to apply transportation 
capacity into use on national railways. The content of the 
authority mainly involves two parts, namely scheduling 
and commanding. However, commanding is not an issue 
of this article because it is more of a technical issue 
that how to dispatch trains and make them comply with 
the schedule made by the authority. This article mainly 
focuses on scheduling power of the authority which 
could apply transportation capacity into use and decide 
which trains can run on national railways at what time. 
Such issue is an institutional one that different countries 
choose different systems according to their railway market 
tradition, railway infrastructure operation and so forth. 
Which scheduling system should we employ in China and 
how should we supervise and regulate such power is the 
main issue of this article. 
It  can be justified that such powerful unified 
scheduling authority exists in Chinese railway market. 
There are mainly three functions the authority could 
serve. firstly, different companies sharing the same 
railway infrastructures are very common in the market 
and when sharing exists, coordination and scheduling 
become necessary to mitigate conflicts and apply capacity 
rationally (Sun, 1999). Secondly, in the railway market, 
which is atypical natural monopoly market, all the services 
offered by one company could cost much less than the 
same amount of services offered by multiple companies 
(Richard, 1969). Therefore, unified scheduling can help 
to realize such feature of natural monopoly market by 
strengthening the coordination between companies and 
to reduce the marginal cost of transportation service by 
raising the utilization efficiency of the infrastructure. 
Thirdly, China has a vast territory with very long and 
complicated national railway networks which are 
currently run by 18 national railway companies which are 
directly owned by the CRC and divided by geographic 
domain. However, limited by their domain, 18 companies 
cannot solve all the coordination problems on their own 
especially when scheduling a train path covering railways 
run by multiple national companies, namely cross-track 
operation. Therefore, a nationally unified scheduling 
authority should be created to coordinate between all the 
national companies especially in the cases of cross-track 
usage and operations. 
The problems and contradictions about Unified 
Scheduling Authority arise here in the cases of cross-
track usage and operations. Many countries once suffered 
or is suffering from similar problems as that in China; 
however, from the perspective of terminology, different 
terms are employed by scholars of different countries 
like track access/track right, capacity allocation or time 
path allocation. As a matter of fact, the terminological 
distinctions reflect different systems of market regulation 
in railway markets. The existence of unified scheduling 
authority suggests a less developed market with highly 
control and plan, while, track access or capacity allocation 
could arise from market-oriented negotiation between 
equal autonomous parties which is exactly the trend and 
direction of Chinese railway market. 
1.2  The Necessity to Regulate the Unified 
Scheduling Authority
The necessity to put the Unified Scheduling Authority 
into the cage of institution can firstly be reflected by its 
importance. The commanding and scheduling authority of 
the CRC and its affiliated 18 national railway companies 
can have a decisive effect on the capacity allocation and 
train dispatch of transportation companies. Without being 
scheduled and involved in the timetable, no companies 
could have any productivity or make any value out of 
the national railways, no matter how large the expected 
transportation capacity is. In other words, the life and 
death of transportation companies literally depend on the 
scheduling authority. Therefore, only when the scheduling 
authority is rationally regulated and fully supervised, 
could the transportation companies and potential investors 
feel safe to enter into this field. 
Secondly, Power without proper balance leads to 
corruption and so does the unified scheduling authority. 
Rent-seeking possibility created by the authority could 
be enormous given the current situation of undeveloped 
railway market which would result in serious problems 
of inefficiency, wasting of transportation resources and 
corruption. Therefore, rational regulation, like information 
disclosure and proper remedy channels, could place more 
weights in controlling rent-seeking behaviors.
Thirdly, China has not initiated its efforts to separate 
the network and operation of railway companies. Together 
with the CRC and its affiliated 18 national railway 
companies, most local railway companies (owned by 
local governments) and private railway companies are 
comprehensive railway companies which own and operate 
all the necessary equipment and technology for railway 
transportation business, including railway infrastructure, 
locomotive, carriages, and technicians and so on. In other 
words, such railway companies are doing business in both 
railway network operation and passenger/freight transport 
services. Therefore, within the same domain, competition 
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exists  among al l  the comprehensive companies 
theoretically. However, because of the market dominated 
position of national railway networks, the CRC and its 
affiliated 18 national railway companies, which own the 
scheduling power, perform both the players and referees 
in Chinese railway market. Such arrangement violates the 
basic natural fairness that No man can be judge in his own 
cause. Even though the current pattern of Chinese railway 
may not be changed in a short time, proper regulation 
and balance scheme would function to keep the railway 
transportation business a fair game. 
This article logically starts from this point where we 
understand the direction of Chinese railway market and 
the problems of lack of regulation about the Unified 
Scheduling Authority, and try to learn something from 
other countries with advanced experience in marketization 
of railway markets.
2 .   A  C O M PA R AT I V E  S T U D Y  O N 
FOREIGN RAILWAYS: THE SCHEDULING 
AND ITS SUPERVISION
2.1  Railway Scheduling Mode under the 
Separation of the Network and Operation in 
Europe
Under the lead of European Union, European countries 
initiate their systematic reform of railway market in the 
1990s. Before the reform, countries in Europe usually 
employed large state-owned companies dominating the 
railway markets which would cover both infrastructure 
construction and passenger/freight transportation 
services because of the demand of war and the economic 
development, such as national railway in Sweden (S.J.), 
State-owned railway in france (SNCf) and Railway 
Company of W. Germany (Deutsche Bundesbahn). As 
the EU integrative development went on, the EU issued a 
series of directives since 1991 to push forward the railway 
market reform. Directive 91/440/EEC initially raised 
the separation of network and operation (or otherwise 
called vertical separation) as the principle and direction 
of railway market reform which required independent 
accounting arrangement between infrastructure ownership 
and transport service. Moreover, the Directive also 
requested that governments should quit from intervening 
the daily operation and budget of railway companies, 
namely privatization55. As shown above, Directive 91/440/
EEC set an institutional foundation for the further reform 
of railway market. 
Directive 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC and 2001/14/
EC afterwards raised several new requirements which, 
5 Detailed provisions are available at EU Directive 91/440/
EEC, Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:31991L0440.
together with directive 91/440/EEC, constituted a railway 
reform package plan for the EU Countries. To further 
ensure a fair compete market environment, directive 
2001/12/EC mandated that the track right allocation and 
access fee collection must be physically divided from the 
transport service providers. In other words, players can no 
longer act like referees66.Directive 2001/14/EC afterwards 
made several detailed rules of track right allocation and 
access fee collection for railway infrastructure managers, 
among which Provision 4 of Chapter 2 provided that 
in cases that infrastructure managers are affiliated to 
transport companies, all the administrative powers 
authorized to the managers in the directive, except for 
fee collection, must be delegated to independent third 
parties, which includes the power to allocate railway track 
access. furthermore, Provision 30 there of regulates the 
supervision body and rules related to our issue include: 
(a) the supervision body must be independent from any 
infrastructure manger; (b) the supervision body should 
take and deal with complaints from track access applicants 
about fees and access allocation; and (c) the supervision 
body shall have authority to keep an eye on the activities, 
like negotiations, between infrastructure managers 
and track users. Meanwhile, right to litigation must be 
ensured when any party is unsettled by action of the 
supervision body77.
EU Member States basically followed the requirements 
and timetable of the EU directives during the reform 
process of railway markets. Take Germany as an example, 
national railway Deutsche Reichsbahn from E. Germany 
and national railway Deutsche Bundesbahn from W. 
Germany merged into one huge state-owned institution 
called BEV which enjoyed both public and private 
functions in 1993. functions of BEV were separated 
in 1994 when the private business functions, including 
infrastructure management and transport service provision, 
were undertaken by DB AG, a market enterprise, and 
public function of supervision was transferred to the 
federal railway bureau (EBA). In 1999, Germany 
completed the separation of network and operation, and 
DB AG was divided according to business scope, namely 
DB Reise & Touristic AG responsible for long distance 
passenger transport, DB Regio AG responsible for short 
distance passenger transport, DB Cargo AG responsible 
for freight transport and DB Netz AG responsible for 
infrastructure management. The infrastructure manager 
DB Netz AG may allocate track access and collect track 
usage fee through equal negotiation with the track users. 
The supervision body EBA is only a supervisor on 
6 Detailed provisions are available at EU Directive 2001/12/EC, 
Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:32001L0012:EN:HTML.
7 Detailed provisions are available at EU Directive 2001/14/EC, 
Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:32001L0014:EN:HTML.
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technical problems and safety with an authority to deal 
with the disputes between the infrastructure manger and 
the users. However, EBA does not enjoy any authority to 
intervene in detailed business like usage price decision 
or track access allocation, and there is an anti-monopoly 
authority in Germany which is in charge of cases that 
the infrastructure manger discriminates among the users 
(Luger, 2008).
Besides Germany, countries like france and Sweden 
also followed the path of EU directives and have very 
similar railway market reform as that in Germany which 
can be roughly summarized into two main steps. The 
first step is to make railway companies independent from 
the governments and to distract private business function 
from public regulative function. The second step is the 
realization of network and operation separation which is 
aimed to further improve the market-oriented situation 
and normalize the competitive rules. As to the track 
usage allocation and usage fee setting, bilateral methods, 
like equal negotiation between the manager and the 
users, are employed, rather than unilateral decision made 
by any authority.
2.2  From ICC to STB: The Transition of the U.S. 
Railway Regulation
The earliest railway in the U.S. was Baltimore-Ohio 
railway, opened in 1830 with 21 kilometers in total. As 
the vast development of railway market, the regulative 
policy thereof experienced several transitions. At the 
beginning, interstate Commerce Act was passed in 1887 
to stable the railway transport prices, to normalize the 
railway market and to stop the northerly competition. The 
Act also created the first U.S. independent agency in the 
history, namely the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(hereinafter referred to ICC)88. However, facing with 
the fierce competition from booming markets of road 
transportation, shipping and air transportation, the 
railway market in the U.S. experienced huge recession 
under the strict regulation of ICC and many railway 
companies were bankrupt back then. In 1980, Staggers 
Rail Act was passed by the congress in order to re-
boom the railway market through deregulation and 
railway companies, to some extent, regained their right 
to autonomy. ICC met with its termination in 1995 and 
the Surface Transportation Board (hereinafter referred to 
STB) was created instead to further carry on the policy of 
deregulation in railway market.
In the U.S. railway market, even though railway 
transport companies usually have their own track and 
infrastructures, with the limitation of the network domain, 
it is very common for the transport companies to use 
track owned by other companies, which is called “joint 
8 Detailed background of the “Interstate Commerce Act” is available 
at the website of U.S. Archives, retrieved from http://www.
ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=49.
traffic arrangement” in the US and is very similar to 
the situation in China that local and private companies 
need to be scheduled on national railways. for example, 
the Amtrak, a passenger transport company, operates 
its transport business on the scale of 33796 kilometers, 
while its railway network only reaches about 1000 
kilometers and thus the Amtrak need to rent railways 
from other companies to meet its demand99. In such 
cases, all the related matters, like track use fee and 
timetable scheduling, would be decided through 
bilateral negotiations. 
Unlike the EU railway reform, the U.S. does not 
insist on the vertical separation. As shown above, the 
EU way of reform insists that the vertical separation 
could help to normalize the market order and prevent 
discrimination. However, the U.S. chooses another way 
to keep the market in order which is competition. A fully 
competitive market is the key to ensure fairness in the 
U.S. railway market rather than strict regulation. The 
competitions may be generated from both inside and 
outside the railway market. Inside the market, parallel 
railways owned by different track mangers commonly 
exist between major cities and the track users may choose 
between them according to price, quality and some other 
conditions. Competitions from outside the market impact 
the railway business even harder by offering potential 
shippers and passengers with more and more efficient 
means of transport, like road transport and air transport. 
In contrast, Chinese railway market does not enjoy 
such efficient competition because of the existence of 
the conspicuous monopoly of national railway and the 
country’s dependency on railway transport.
Competition has shown great effect in balancing the 
market; however, it may never replace the supervision 
from the public sector. from ICC to STB, the regulative 
policies and rules in the U.S. railway market experienced 
several transitions and the regulative authority continually 
adjusted its position and strategies to serve the 
development of the market. 
from the foundation of ICC in 1887 to the born of 
Staggers Rail Act in 1980, the regulation of railway 
market was rather strict and ICC enjoyed a great deal of 
powers to supervise the market activities, especially joint 
traffic activities. for example, Interstate Commerce Act 
authorized ICC to address inquiries to railway companies 
for any management and business related questions and 
to request any necessary and complete information from 
railway companies about fares, transactions and agreements 
and so on1010. Meanwhile, companies were required to file 
their schedule of rates, fares, charges and all contracts, 
9 Data was collected from the website of NRA, retrieved from http://
www.nra.gov.cn/fwyd/zlzx/jwtlxx/jytddt/201309/t20130917_2583.
htm.
10 See Interstate Commerce Act, Sec. 12
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agreements, or arrangements about joint traffic to ICC1111. 
furthermore, Transportation Act of 1920 authorized ICC 
to limit the railway transport fare prices in certain scope, 
so that the rate of return of railway companies can be kept 
around 6% (Luger, 2008). Under such strict and restrictive 
regulation implemented by powerful ICC, it is safe to say 
that the autonomy of railway companies back then was 
greatly compromised. ICC’s pre-approval was required for 
many business activities, including the track use agreement 
or joint traffic arrangement between railway companies. 
Highly restrictive regulation resulted in repressed business 
activities. During that time, the number of track agreements 
approved by ICC was no more than 25 each year and the 
involved track covered less than 400 miles (approximately 
644 kilometers) (Conant, 1963). As a matter of fact, joint 
traffic arrangement or infrastructure rent arrangement 
between railway companies should be encouraged, rather 
than repressed, because such arrangement can efficiently 
raise the utilization of existing network and reduce the cost 
of parallel railway construction.
The deterioration of railway market made the U.S. 
government realize that highly restrictive regulation 
hindered the development of railway market. As a 
response, Staggers Rail Act was passed in 1980 which 
initiated the era of deregulation. Generally speaking, 
ICC was deprived of powers to intervene in detailed 
management and business of railway companies like 
fixating fares and joint traffic arrangement. ICC had no 
place to intervene as long as agreements were reached 
through negotiation among all the involved parties (Luger, 
2008). After Staggers Rail Act, remained authorities of 
ICC can be summarized into two aspects, namely (a) 
to ensure rate reasonableness; and (b) to maintain fair 
competitive access and prevent discrimination in the 
market (Cunningham & Jenkins, 1997). furthermore, 
both of the remained authorities were kept at a very 
modest level. for example, companies are free to choose 
their own partners for joint traffic arrangement and ICC 
cannot intervene as long as no deliberate discrimination 
is shown in the deal. Moreover, no company has been 
punished by ICC because of such discriminative action 
ever since Staggers Rail Act was passed (Cunningham 
& Jenkins, 1997).
“ICC Termination Act of 1995” marked the end of ICC 
and all of its remained duties were undertaken by STB1212. 
Specifically, STB still has its duty to prevent monopoly 
and to promote competition in the market. Moreover, 
STB maintains several approval authorities including the 
corporate merger and dissolution.
Above all, the whole ideas of the U.S. reform became 
quite clear. The first principle is to promote and ensure 
fair and complete competition. The second principle is 
that the supervision body is only responsible for those 
11 See Interstate Commerce Act, Sec. 6
12 49 U.S.C. § 702 (2009)
problems that market itself cannot solve, like monopoly 
problem and discrimination.
3.  SUGGESTIONS TO REGULATE THE 
SCHEDULING AUTHORITY UNDER THE 
REFORM OF FUNCTIONS SEPARATION 
OF CHINESE RAILWAYS
As shown above, the unified scheduling authority cannot 
be treated merely as business act of CRC and leave it 
solely to the market, because the public function of the 
authority, if being abused, would cause substantial harm to 
other railway companies and the public interest. China has 
just initiated its effort to shape market order of Chinese 
railways and unified scheduling authority which enjoys 
both public and private characters should be rationally 
regulated and normalized, or it would impede the whole 
process of marketization.
3.1  Retrospect on Foreign Experience: A Mirror 
for Chinese Railway Reform
The independence of  rai lway market  f rom the 
government and marketization of competition have been 
two main paths employed by above foreign examples. 
However, with respect to the track usage matter on this 
issue or joint traffic in the U.S. context, differences exist 
among countries. 
following the direction of vertical separation, EU 
Member States separated the track managers with 
transport service providers to keep the market in order. 
Even if complete formal separation is not available for 
some companies, independent third party would be invited 
to ensure substantive fairness and basic separation of the 
track manage department and transport service department 
would be achieved at least within the company. Therefore, 
players are no longer the referees which constitute 
the foundation of fairness in the market. Meanwhile, 
as supplement to market, supervision body would be 
authorized to oversee the track usage arrangements and 
other related activities in order to prevent discrimination 
and ensure fair competition.
Even though the U.S. did not employ the vertical 
separation mode, market competition is the key to 
normalize business activities like joint traffic arrangement. 
Through the U.S. reform of deregulation, autonomy was 
given back to companies to choose partners and decide 
prices, and STB only reserves modest authority to step 
up when autonomy or market fails. However, loose 
regulative environment is not the characteristic of all the 
countries which did not employ the vertical separation 
mode. Japan, on the other hand, has relatively strict 
regulative policy in its railway market and many business 
activities, like track usage arrangement, need pre-approval 
from the supervision body, because it cannot reach the 
competitive level of the U.S. railway market. In Japan, 
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passenger transport business dominates their railway 
market and each company has its own geographic domain 
where competition from parallel network rarely exists. 
Moreover, because of its domestic mountainous landform, 
road transportation cannot constitute serious impact on the 
railway transport business (Luger, 2008). Therefore, there 
is no good or bad regulative strategy per se and regulative 
intensity should match with competitive situation of the 
domestic railway market. 
Back to China, Chinese railway market currently 
has no timetable to initiate vertical separation like 
that in Germany, but the independence requirement of 
infrastructure management and transport service sets a 
feasible example for Chinese further reform. Meanwhile, 
the competitive degree of Chinese railway market has not 
been fully developed as that in the U.S. and therefore, 
relatively strict regulation should be inflicted to keep the 
market in order and prevent CRC and its 18 affiliated 
railway companies from abusing their dominated 
positions. Moreover, strong policy should also be 
employed to further promote competition.
3.2  Fitting into the Market: To Normalize the 
Unified Scheduling Authority 
As the unified scheduling authority, CRC also undertakes 
the biggest part of transport services of China which 
has already covered 978.4 million kilometers. As shown 
above, players equipped with referees’ authority would 
break the balance of market competition. Therefore, 
following steps should be employed to normalize the 
unified scheduling authority.
firstly, based on fair and stable market order, 
competition should be further promoted. The core purpose 
of marketization is to promote competition and market can 
function well to distribute resources and to offer rational 
prices, only when the market is fully competitive. Even 
though Chinese railway market faces fierce competition 
from outside the market, like road and air transportation, 
it is still irreplaceable and competition inside the market 
rarely exists for national railway companies. To promote 
market competition, Russian railway supervision 
department was inflicted with quantized duties and tasks 
to promote competition, which required 50% of the freight 
transport capacity to be operated by private companies 
(Luger, 2008). Similar policy could be employed by 
China as well and substantial amount shares of private 
capital should be ensured in the market as the foundation 
of further marketization.
Secondly, internal business procedures should be 
clearly elaborated and strictly kept. Within CRC and its 
affiliates, infrastructure management department should 
be independent from transport service department. 
Business activities between above departments should 
be recorded in detail and the realization of accounts 
separation is prerequisite for supervision from NRA. 
Unified scheduling authority should be conducted by 
the infrastructure management department through 
normalized protocol and all the market entities, including 
the transport service department within the CRC, 
should be treated fairly. Moreover, all the protocols and 
information of business activities should be made to 
public in appropriate ways so that CRC and its affiliates 
can be put under the public supervision. After all, 
Sunshine is the best antiseptic.
Thirdly, dispute resolution mechanism should be built. 
Efficient dispute resolution can not only resolve disputes, 
but also serve as a covert supervisory mechanism which 
may expose management defects. Two channels should 
be constructed for dispute resolution with respect to the 
unified scheduling authority. On one hand, the jurisdiction 
of courts should be ensured over any dispute aroused 
by the alleged abuse of the unified scheduling authority, 
because the essence of the authority is a business conduct 
between equal parties through contracts and it should 
fall under the protection of civil law. On the other 
hand, railway supervision body like NRA can also hear 
complaints from business entities regarding conducts 
of the unified scheduling authority which may serve as 
reasons and evidence for further administrative decisions.
3.3  The Promotion of Rational Supervision
The basic principle of supervision should be set that 
government only intervenes when the market fails. In 
railway market, government supervision should take a 
modest attitude when effective competition duly works. 
However, the exercise of unified scheduling authority 
is currently beyond the capacity of market competition 
because the dominated position of national railway 
networks which enjoy high dependence of local and 
private railway companies. Moreover, as shown above, 
discrimination and abuse of scheduling authority can 
widely exist in the market. Therefore, government should 
take its responsibility to protect public and the third 
parties’ interests in cases regarding the exercise of unified 
scheduling authority. Specifically, CRC and its affiliates 
should be ordered to file their conduct code, contracts and 
other paper work regarding the infrastructure management 
with NRA which reserves the authority to review the 
validity and legality of all the activities. Moreover, NRA 
shall hear complaints and reports from business entities 
about wrongful conducts of CRC and its affiliates and 
if the wrongful conduct is verified to be true, NRA shall 
have the authority to inflict administrative penalty.
CONCLUSION
Market-oriented reform of the railway industry is based 
on the introduction of diversified market players and the 
promotion of competition in the market. Organizational 
reform of separation between government and enterprises 
has provided a solid foundation to regulate the market 
order and to promote market competition. However, 
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while the business functions of the former Ministry of 
Railways were undertaken by CRC, it does not mean that 
the government can dodge the responsibility to protect 
the public interest. Regulation and supervision should be 
in place where CRC and its affiliates act to affect public 
and third parties’ interest of which the unified scheduling 
authority sets a typical example. Based on the reference 
to the experience of foreign railway market reforms, the 
principle can be easily summarized that government forces 
shall be modest in the market and act as supplement when 
the market fails. Although the competition mechanism of 
Chinese railway market is not completed, and effective 
competition is inadequate, the railway companies still face 
a great deal of challenges due to the huge impact of other 
modes of transports like roads and air transport. With 
respect to the supervision of unified scheduling authority, 
the internal separate pattern of infrastructure management 
department and transport service department should 
firstly be ensured and strict conduct code shall be set and 
followed doing business between departments. Business 
decisions and arrangements shall be reached in the market 
through equal negotiations between business entities and 
the infrastructure management department of CRC and its 
affiliates shall treat all the track users without prejudice. 
When it comes to the public and third parties’ interest, 
like circumstances of discrimination and exclusion of 
competition, the government shall step up and intervene 
in the activities. As a power concerning the survival of 
railway companies, the unified scheduling authority shall 
be rationally regulated from both the market and the 
government in order to effectively avoid abuse and reduce 
the space of rent-seeking, so that a solid foundation could 
be set to attract local and private investment and to further 
develop the railway market. 
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